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Many readers of Kant’s ethical writings take him to be primarily con-
cerned with offering guidelines for action. At the least, they write about
Kant as if this were the purpose of his ethical writings. For example,
Christine Korsgaard, in her influential article Kant’s Analysis of Obliga-
tion: The Argument of Groundwork I, writes that, ‘‘the argument of
Groundwork I is an attempt to give what I call a ‘motivational analysis’ of
the concept of a right action, in order to discover what that concept
applies to, that is, which actions are right.’’1 Similar comments are not
hard to find in the secondary literature. This, however, is a fundamentally
misguided way of reading Kant, since he repeatedly asserts that we do not
need to do moral philosophy in order to discover which actions are right.
We already know how to behave morally and do not need philosophers to
tell us this. ‘‘Common human reason,’’ Kant argues, ‘‘knows very well
how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is
evil, what is in conformity to duty or contrary to duty.’’2 Because people
with pre-philosophical understanding know how to act morally, the
purpose of moral philosophy cannot be to provide us with a set of rules
for correct behavior. If we take Kant’s claims about common human
reason seriously, then his aim in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals cannot be to discover which actions are right.
It is instructive on this point to compare Kant’s conception of
moral philosophy with Christian Wolff’s. Wolff’s ethics was dominant in
Germany during Kant’s philosophical development, and Kant himself
based his ethics lectures on a textbook written by one of Wolff’s followers,
Alexander Baumgarten. Unlike Kant, Wolff is an intellectualist who
believes that there is no gap between recognizing an act as good and the
act of willing it, He therefore believes that immoral behavior is always
the result of mistaken beliefs about goodness. Thus, he can claim; ‘‘The
knowledge of good is a motive of the will.... It cannot happen the one
does not will an inherently good act if one distinctly conceives it ... So if
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we do not will [such acts], there is no other cause than that we do not
recognize them’’ as good.3
If we knew what was good for us, we would do whatever was good for
us. As a result of this, Wolff maintains that the only way we can become
better human beings is by improving our knowledge of goodness,
Unfortunately, discovering the truth about goodness is an arduous task,
and Wolff is concerned that ‘‘perhaps someone will wonder how it will go
with the pursuit of good and the omission of bad if so much is required in
order to distinguish good from bad.’’4 His response is to suggest a divi-
sion of labor. It is not necessary that all people spend time putting in the
work to distinguish the good from the bad; this job can be left to
the philosophers. Thus Wolff explains that he is not just concerned with
the discoverers of moral truths, for, ‘‘it is not necessary that all men be
discoverers. It is enough if some among the learned devote themselves to
discovery, whose findings the others can afterwards learn, which is much
easier.’’5
According to Wolff, then, the function of a moral philosopher is to
discover the truth about good and bad and to communicate this truth to
people who do not have the time, inclination or capacity to think about
such matters. Wolff claims that this is the primary reason he writes his
ethical works. Thus, he explains: ‘‘Because not everyone is skilled in
discovery, ...those to whom God has lent the strength and opportunity to
carry out this work better than others are obligated to share in books for
the others what they have learned about the soul.’’6 The function of moral
philosophers is, from this perspective, to communicate moral knowledge
to people who are ignorant so that they can lead more virtuous lives.
Kant, in contrast, has far more respect for the moral capacities of
common men and women, and as a result of this he believes that there is
‘‘no need of science and philosophy to know what one has to do to be
honest and good, and even wise and virtuous.’’7 If, however, we do not
need moral philosophy to know what we must do in order to be good, we
may might question what the point of moral philosophy is. Kant himself
believes that moral inquiry is not a purely theoretical exercise but that it
does have some practical value, and any serious interpretation of Kant’s
ethics must take this into account. Before examining Kant’s account of
this role, however, we will first make a few remarks about the content of
Kant’s moral philosophy. What is said here is intended to make the need
for an account of the value of moral philosophy even more urgent since,
as we shall see, Kant, like Wolff, believes that moral philosophers attempt
to provide us with a clearer understanding of goodness. However, unlike




Instead of attempting to discover which actions are right, Kant’s primary
aim in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to explain what it
is that a virtuous human being motivated by duty is striving to be. He
begins by examining the moral consciousness of pre-philosophical indi-
viduals. Such individuals know how to be moral and have an obscure
grasp of what it is to be moral, in that they have some idea of what it is to
be a good person. Kant names such an idea an ideal, and believes that to
have a moral conscience involves awareness of such an ideal which serves
as a yardstick. Engaging in moral philosophy involves setting forth this
idea in its full purity. Thus; in his ethics lectures from 1785 Kant explains:
‘‘to expound morality in its full purity is to set forth an Idea of practical
reason. Such Ideas are not chimeras, for they constitute the guideline to
which we must constantly approach.... We have to possess a yardstick by
which to estimate our moral worth, and know the degree to which we are
faulty and deficient. ... In the ideal we turn the ideas into a model.’’8
This idea is an idea of pure reason, and as such it can be understood
theoretically. For most of us, however, our theoretical understanding of
this idea is obscure and the aim of the moral philosopher is to clarify our
theoretical understanding of this ideal. This is Kant’s aim in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, where he refers to this ideal as
the idea of a good will. Thus, at the start of section one, Kant explains his
objective and strategy. He writes:
We have, then, to explicate the concept of a will that is to be
esteemed in itself and that is good apart from any other purpose,
as it already dwells in natural sound understanding and needs not
so much to be taught as only to be clarified – this concept that
always takes first place in estimating the total worth of our actions
and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do so, we
shall set before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains
that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and
hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making it
unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine
forth all the more brightly.9
Here Kant makes it clear that we already possess the concept of a good
will, that this concept dwells in natural sound understanding, and that
what he proposes to do is to explicate and clarify this concept. At the end
of section two, he reaches the conclusion that the concept of a good will is
the idea of an autonomous member of a realm of ends. In claiming that
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the concept of a good will already dwells in natural sound understanding
he means that this concept is a theoretical idea that can be understood
theoretically. The concept of duty contains the concept of a good will
because it is our duty to be a good will, and to fully understand the
categorical imperative is to understand that it is our duty to strive to be a
member of an ideal realm of ends. Kant’s aim, then, cannot be to teach us
this ideal, since it is an idea that we are already aware of, albeit obscurely.
Instead, his aim is merely to explicate and clarify this concept. Kant is
more explicit about this in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he writes
that,
[N]o moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any
feeling whatsoever. Any such principle is really an obscurely
thought metaphysics. ... The way the teacher presents this (his tech-
nique) should not always be metaphysical nor his terms scholastic,
unless he wants to train his pupil as a philosopher. But his thought
must go all the way back to the elements of metaphysics, without
which no certitude or purity can be expected in the doctrine of
virtue, nor indeed any moving force.10
To teach ethics is to clarify an obscure metaphysics, and to do it philo-
sophically involves doing it in scholastic terms. Although Kant’s ultimate
aim is to clarify the idea of a good will, he begins with an examination of
the concept of duty, which will somehow help us in this task. Kant
believes that the prephilosophical consciousness of duty is a subjective,
felt consciousness of the moral ideal. The consciousness of duty or obli-
gation is, however, a consciousness that has a certain idea as its object,
namely the idea of being a member of a realm of ends. Thus, in order
to clarify what is involved in this idea, Kant begins by examining our
consciousness of duty, for it is an obscure consciousness of the idea.
For Kant, hearing the call of conscience is a bit like wanting to join a
club or society. We can imagine the idea of an ideal society and decide
that the most important thing in our life is to join it. The idea of such a
society, to be an adequate idea, will include a conception of what the
membership criteria are. However, although being moral is a bit like
choosing to join a club, for a person with a pre-philosophical under-
standing of morality it is like choosing to join a society without being
aware that this is what he is actually doing. The aim of moral philoso-
phers is to provide us with greater clarity about what we are hoping to
become when we listen to our conscience.
The following analogy might help to clarify this account of Kant’s goal
and strategy. A professor wants one of her students to join the American
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Philosophical Association and issues the following command: ‘‘Pay
thirty-five dollars and sign here!’’ The student can understand and follow
this order without really understanding what he has been ordered to do.
The student is immediately aware that he has been ordered to sign a piece
of paper. When the student realizes, perhaps after a discussion with a
friend, that he has been ordered to join the American Philosophical
Association, he has a clearer theoretical understanding of what he has just
been ordered to do. A virtuous individual who listens to his conscience,
and who only acts upon maxims that can be universalized is, so to speak,
applying to join a realm of ends, possibly without understanding theo-
retically that this is what he has been ordered to do. Kant’s goal in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to provide the common
human understanding with such a theoretical understanding.
Instead of attempting to discover which actions are right, then, Kant’s
primary aim is to explain what it is that a virtuous human being, moti-
vated by duty, is striving to be. He begins by examining the moral
consciousness of a pre-philosophical individual. Such an individual
recognizes that she should only act upon maxims that can be universalized
because she implicitly recognizes the value of being an autonomous
member of a realm of ends. Understood in metaphysical terms, the idea of
a realm of ends is the idea of an intelligible world and Kant believes that
each of us has the idea of an intelligible world and that our conscience
implicitly demands that we strive to act in such a way that we can
potentially be members of such a world. This is what Kant means when
he claims in the Critique of Practical Reason that the moral law reveals an
intelligible world to us.11 We do not, however, have to have a detailed
theoretical understanding of what is involved in the idea of being a
member of an intelligible world in order to act appropriately.
For Kant, a virtuous person is someone who listens to his conscience,
and our conscience commands us to strive to be an autonomous member
of a realm of ends. Our moral consciousness, then, involves an obscurely
thought metaphysics and the role of a moral philosopher is to clarify the
metaphysics. As we have already seen, however, Kant believes that we do
not need to clarify the metaphysics in order to act correctly. In a passage
from section one of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, cited
previously, Kant explains that he wishes to clarify our understanding of
the concept of a good will so that it will ‘‘shine forth more brightly.’’12
This provides us with a clue for understanding the reason why Kant
believes that engaging in moral philosophy has some practical value. The
brighter something shines, the more noticeable it is, the harder it is to fail
to pay attention to it. Engaging in moral philosophy, and clarifying the
idea of a good will, helps us to pay attention to the moral ideal. It does
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this in two ways. In making the concept of a good will shine more
brightly, it amplifies the volume of what Kant calls the judgment of
conscience. Perhaps more importantly, it makes it harder for us to give
ourselves excuses. Excuses are, Kant believes, like voices that compete
with the voice of conscience for the attention of our will. This explains the
practical value of engaging in moral philosophy.
2. Intellectualism and Voluntarism
To understand Kant’s account of the role and value of moral philosophy
it is necessary to understand his account of moral motivation and his
explanation of the possibility of immorality. He wishes to steer a middle
course between the Scylla of voluntarism and the Charybdis of intellec-
tualism. An intellectualist maintains that the good is irresistible, because
we always act under the aspect of the good. As a result of this, a
intellectualist can claim that all immoral behavior is a result of not having
a clear enough understanding of goodness. A voluntarist, in contrast,
maintains that however clearly we understand what is good, we are
always free to choose what is bad. Kant agrees with intellectualists that
the good is irresistible. However, he also agrees with voluntarists that we
are free to choose what is bad. In addition, he believes that all of us,
possessing a conscience, have an adequate understanding of goodness.
These commitments seem to be incompatible, since if our conscience
provides us with an adequate understanding of what is involved in being
good, and goodness is irresistible, it is not clear how, and in what sense,
we can choose to be bad. Kant’s solution is to argue, against intellectu-
alists, that our consciousness of goodness is not directly through our
intellects, but through our conscience.
The judgment of conscience is, Kant maintains, infallible and, in so far
as we choose to listen to it, it is irresistible. As a result of this, if we
were truly attentive to the voice of conscience we would always behave
morally. We often, however, fail to pay attention to this voice. Kant
believes that the failure is always the result of a free choice. In so far as we
pay attention to the judgment of conscience, we will be virtuous. We are
free, however, not to listen. This is the locus of our freedom of choice. The
moral law, then, is like the Siren’s voice. In so far as we choose to listen to
it, it is irresistible. We are free, however, to plug our ears or to drown it
out with competing voices.
This account of the locus of free choice helps us understand Kant’s
conception of the role of moral philosophers. As we have seen, Kant
claims that his goal in the Groundwork is to clarify the concept of a good
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will. If Kant were an intellectualist, realizing this goal would serve an
obvious moral function. An intellectualist believes that immoral behavior
is always, and only, a failure to truly understand what is good, and so the
clearer our understanding of what is good, the better we will be. Kant,
however, is not an intellectualist. Indeed, he believes that even the pre-
philosophical human understanding has a good enough understanding of
what is good to always act rightly.
3. The Court of Conscience
The primary role of a moral philosopher is to provide us with a tool that
we can use to help ourselves pay attention to the judgment of conscience.
For Kant, conscience is like an internal court that operates prior to and
after our actions. Thus he explains in his ethics lectures that the con-
science is a ‘‘consciousness of an internal court in a human being,’’ one
‘‘before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another.’’13 This con-
science is like a court and involves, ‘‘the assumption of an accuser, who
seeks to arouse the conscience; a defender, who tries as an advocate to
assuage it; and a judge, who assesses the action by the laws of duty and
establishes the consequences.’’14
When we behave, or plan to behave, immorally, we fail to listen to the
judgment of this court. This judgment, Kant believes, cannot err: the
notion of ‘‘an erring conscience,’’ he writes in the Metaphysics of Morals,
‘‘is an absurdity,’’ and ‘‘if someone is aware that he has acted in accor-
dance with his conscience, then as far as guilt or innocence is concerned
nothing more can be required of him.’’15 When we behave immorally, it is
not that our conscience has erred. Nor is it the case that our conscience
has failed to make a judgment, for the judgment of conscience is ‘‘an
unavoidable fact.’’16 ‘‘Unconscientiousness,’’ then, ‘‘is not lack of con-
science but a propensity to pay no heed to its judgment.’’17 ‘‘So when it is
said that a certain human being has no conscience, what is meant is that
he pays no heed to its verdict.’’l8 When we behave immorally, we attempt
to give excuses to ourselves before this court for not living up to our
moral ideal. We choose to listen to the defense attorney and try to block
out the voice of the judge.
The voice of the judge of conscience is like the voice of a siren. In so far
as we listen to it, it is irresistible. Kant calls the irresistibility of the voice
of the judgment of conscience our moral predisposition. As a result of our
predisposition to morality, Kant believes that we can only fail to be
guided by the voice of our conscience if we stop up our ears or drown it
out, with other voices. Thus, in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
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Reason, Kant argues that, ‘‘The human being (even the worst) does not
repudiate the moral law, whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (be
revoking obedience to it). The law rather imposes itself on him irresistibly,
because of his moral predisposition; and if no other incentive were at
work against it, he would also incorporate it into his supreme maxim as
sufficient determination of his power of choice, i.e. he would be morally
good.’’19
The judgment of conscience is irresistible and, insofar as our inner
ear is open, our faculty of desire will be determined by the law.
Morality, for Kant, like the Stoic, is a matter of attentiveness, and
immorality is the result of a, freely chosen, distraction. Engaging in
moral philosophy helps us avoid distraction and in so doing it provides
access to the law.
The purely intellectual activity of clarifying the idea of a good will
does have some practical effect, since the clearer our theoretical
understanding of the moral ideal, the more difficult it becomes for us to
give ourselves excuses for not living up to it in practice. The reason for
this is that the excuses we provide ourselves with in the court of con-
science are themselves products of our intellect. Clarifying the concept
of a good will can help us quiet the voice of the defense attorney in this
court, and it is this voice that distracts our attention from the voice of
the moral judge.
Kant believes, then, that although the moral ideal infallibly serves as
a compass for our actions, and one that we all have always before our
eyes, we often deliberately squint when we are taking directions. The
moral philosopher cannot stop us squinting. She can, however, point
out to us that we are squinting, which makes it more difficult for us to
give excuses to ourselves if we choose to head in the wrong direction.
The purpose of a moral philosopher, then, is to help us focus our
attention on the moral ideal. Clarifying the moral ideal is to amplify the
voice of the judge within, which is in danger of being drowned out by
the pleading voice of the defense attorney in the court of conscience.
Engaging in moral philosophy, then, can help us promote a particular
duty, namely, ‘‘the duty to cultivate one’s conscience, to sharpen one’s
attentiveness to the voice of the inner judge and to use every means to,
obtain a hearing for it.’’20
4. An Analogy
Kant believes that we all know what it is to do the right thing. Even
the least educated peasant knows how to be moral. The judgment of
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conscience is the same for him as for an enlightened philosopher. This was
a radical position to take in the eighteenth century. The problem with the
philosophically uneducated is that they do not clearly grasp theoretically
what it is to be moral. Their representation of what it is to be moral is
obscure. In his logic lectures Kant explains the distinction between clarity
and obscurity by comparing a suppossed savage, who sees a house from a
distance but is not acquainted with its use, with a modern city dweller.
Both have before them a representation of the same object however, ‘‘as
to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two.
With one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at
the same time. The difference in the form of the cognition rests on a
condition that accompanies all cognition, on consciousness. If I am
conscious of the representation, it is clear; if I am not conscious of it,
obscure.’’21 To have an obscure representation, then, is to recognize an
object without having an adequate concept of it. If we have an obscure
representation of something, we can pick it out by pointing to it, but we
are an able to give an adequate conceptual description. To introduce
clarity is to provide such an adequate conceptual description.
Our obscure representation of what it is to be moral is a good enough
guide to action, providing the common human understanding with its
moral know-how. However, even though this obscure representation of
the moral ideal is enough for us to know how to be moral, a clearer
representation of this ideal does have practical value as it makes it more
difficult to give ourselves excuses if we fail to live up to the ideal. Perhaps
the following analogy can help us understand this value.
Let us imagine that we are going for a walk in the country with a
friend. At one point we decide to split ways and our friend points to a
building in the distance, a house on a hill, and tells us that he will meet us
there in three hours. We vaguely make out something in the distance but
it is too far away to make out what it is. We have an obscure represen-
tation of our goal, and we know that if we pay attention to where we are
going we will have no problem finding our way there. If, however, we
become distracted by the view, and stop paying attention to where we are
heading and suddenly there are two hills in front of us, one with a house
on top and one with a pub, we might, very easily, end up waiting for our
friend in the pub. If our friend turns up after waiting in the rain outside
the house on the other hill for three hours he will not be happy. We might
tell him that we are sorry, but that he should not blame us or be angry
with us because we honestly thought that we were in the right place, and
in some sense it is true that we did not know that we were waiting in the
wrong place. Trying to convince our friend, or ourselves, that we are
entirely blameless, however, is in bad faith. It is true that we did not
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choose to make it our maxim to stand up our friend. If someone had
come into the pub and told us that our friend was waiting outside in the
rain, we would have jumped up and gone to find him. Our being in the
wrong place, however, is willful in the sense that we chose not to pay
attention to where we were going and our friend can legitimately be angry
with us for having violated some ideal of friendship. If we had really cared
about meeting him we would have paid attention to where we were going.
What Kant calls common human understanding has a similar rela-
tionship to the idea of a good will as the travelers have to the house on the
hill. With common human understanding we know how to be moral just
as the travelers know how to get to their meeting point. With common
human understanding, however, we cannot really give an adequate
description of what it is to be moral. This makes it easier for us to give
ourselves excuses for failing to reach our moral destination. Kant’s pur-
pose in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to clarify what is
involved in the idea of a good will, in order to have us understand what it
is we are trying to be when we listen to our conscience. When we part
ways he wants us to be able to say: ‘‘Let us meet outside that house with
the green door over there.’’ We can still end up waiting somewhere else,
but if we have been given such explicit instructions it is much harder for
us to give excuses to our friend, or to ourselves. If a friend has given us
such clear instructions it will be much harder to convince him, or our-
selves, that we honestly cared about the meeting if we end up in the wrong
place.
This analogy helps us understand the role of a moral philosopher and
teacher. The role of a moral teacher is not to tell us how to be moral. We
already know that. The role of a moral educator is to make our obscure
understanding of what it is to be moral shine out more brightly. This
clearer understanding will not make us moral, but it will make it harder
for us to listen to the excuses of the defense attorney in the court of
conscience.
5. Excuses
To understand the way in which engaging in moral philosophy can help
us avoid giving excuses, it is helpful to understand the types of excuses
that we give ourselves when we behave badly. Kant suggests that there are
two principal types of excuses we give ourselves when we act, or plan to
act, immorally. Engaging in moral philosophy, makes it harder for us to
give ourselves such excuses, because the excuses always have a basis in the
intellect and thus can be combated by theoretical enquiry.
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The first type of excuse is a result of a willful corruption of our pure
moral ideal. The second type of excuse involves willfully convincing
ourselves that our moral ideal is impossible, either in itself or as an idea
that can serve as an ideal for beings like us. This is despair.
Kant makes it clear that moral philosophers can play a major role in
the fight against the corruption of our moral ideal. Thus Kant argues that
‘‘a metaphysics of morals is... indispensably necessary, not merely because
of a motive to speculation, ... but also because morals themselves remain
subject to all sorts of corruption as long as we are without that clue and
supreme norm by which to appraise them correctly.’’22 There are a
number of ways our moral ideal can be corrupted. We can, for example,
choose to be guided not by a pure ideal but by a watered down version.
We do this, Kant believes, when we take happiness as our ideal. Happi-
ness is an ideal, but, as Kant maintains in the Groundwork, it ‘‘is not an
ideal of reason but the imagination.’’23 Another case of the corruption of
our ideal is when we take another particular individual as our ideal,
comparing ourselves not to the pure idea of a good will, but with another,
imperfect, human being, and taking the imperfect behaviour of that
person as our standard. Choosing to imitate another person instead of
taking the pure idea of an autonomous individual as our moral archetype,
is one of the most common causes of excuses, and a form of excuse-giving
that Kant is particularly worried about, since it allows us to excuse all
sorts of behavior as excusably human. Thus in the ethics lectures he gave
at the time he was working on the Groundwork, Kant explains that, ‘‘an
example is when a general proposition of reason is exhibited in concreto in
the given case. ... No examples are needed in matters of religion and
morality. ... The examples, therefore, must be judged by moral rules, not
morality and religion by the examples. The archetype lies in the under-
standing.’’24
One of the targets of this attack is almost certainly the pietist culture
around him. Perhaps the most popular genre of eighteenth century pietist
literature were conversion narratives. In them, pietists told the stories of
their own rebirths. Such narratives were extremely popular and were
presented as models to be followed. Thus Johann Semler, a contemporary
of Kant’s, could write that, for the pietists ‘‘the story of ones own
experience and edification became the rule for others to follow exactly.’’25
Kant believes that moral philosophers, in providing conceptual clarity
about what is involved in our pure idea of a good will, make it easier for
us to avoid the temptation of substituting the corrupted pseudo-ideal of
happiness, or the behavior of others, for the pure idea of a good will.
Even if we are clear about what morality demands, Kant believes that
we often willfully convince ourselves that it is impossible for us to live up
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to our moral ideal, either because we convince ourselves that the idea of
an autonomous agent is itself impossible, or because we convince our-
selves that it is impossible for us, as creatures with needs, to live up to
such an ideal. There are two forms of despair. The first type of despair is
the result of a recognition of our weakness as sensuous beings who have
needs. When we give in to such despair, we tell ourselves that we have
certain needs that it is physically impossible not to satisfy. The second
type of despair is a result of the fact that we necessarily experience our-
selves as phenomenal spatio-temporal, and hence conditioned, beings,
whereas our moral ideal is an idea of pure reason, and as such it is the
idea of a being that is unconditioned. When we give in to this form of
despair we tell ourselves that it is logically impossible for a phenomenal
being to be an autonomous individual.
A moral philosopher, Kant maintains, can help us avoid both forms of
despair. She canhelp us avoid the first kindof despair by convincing us that it
is not unreasonable to hope that there is a just and benevolent God who
ensures thathappiness is allocated inproportion tovirtue. Ifwe rigidly follow
our duty, it is not unreasonable to hope that our needs will be met. She can
help us avoid the second type of despair by convincing us that although we
intuit ourselves as essentially causally determined conditionedbeings, there is
nothing contradictory in thinking of ourselves as autonomous, and hence
unconditioned, individuals. A moral philosopher can do this by convincing
us of the plausibility of transcendental, or formal, idealism. Proponents of
formal idealism make a distinction between the form and matter of the
objects of intuition, and claim that although the matter of the objects of
intuition is real, the spatio-temporal form of the objects is ideal and sub-
jective. If we accept transcendental idealism, we can think of objects of
intuition, including ourselves, as unconditioned without contradiction.
Although anobject of experience cannot be thought of as unconditioned and
simple qua object of experience, there is nothing contradictory in thinking of
such an object as unconditioned and simple in itself.
6. Conclusion
Engaging in metaphysical speculation and working out clearly what is
involved in the idea of being an intelligible world, and recognizing that
there are no contradictions involved in it, cannot make us virtuous. To be
virtuous, all we need to do is to listen to our conscience. Kant believes
that grasping the idea of a good will in its purity is neither necessary nor
sufficient for us actually to be good. Having grasped the idea in its purity,
we are still faced with the choice of whether or not to recognize it as a
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practical ideal and to choose to strive to instantiate it. Grasping the idea
in its purity, however, can make the choice to be good easier, or at the
least, it makes it more difficult for us to give ourselves excuses for not
living up to it. Thus, the conceptual clarity that arises as a result of
engaging with traditional metaphysical questions about the nature of the
intelligible world cannot provide us with knowledge, but it can help us
avoid temptation and despair, It can help us avoid the temptation of
replacing our pure idea with a corrupted, watered-down, impure, pseudo-
ideal such as the ideal of happiness and it can help us avoid the despair of
convincing ourselves that there is no such ideal or that it is impossible for
us to live up to or instantiate such an ideal.
If this reading is correct, then, at its heart, Kant’s ethics is surprisingly
antinomian and particularist. Kant’s rigorism is not basic to his ethics but
is a result of the fact that we view ourselves through a glass darkly. Being
good is not to follow a rule or a procedure but merely to listen to our
conscience on a case by case basis. To be autonomous is not, primarily, to
follow law, but to make law, and in true pietist spirit Kant believes that if
we listen to our conscience, then our hearts will open and law will come
pouring out. If we possessed moral self-knowledge there would be no need
for moral rules and principles. However, we lack such self-knowledge and
are prone to self-deception. We only know our empirical character and
not our intelligible character or disposition. Our ultimate motivation
remains obscure to us, and we never really know whether we are listening
to the voice of the moral judge or that of the defense attorney. What stops
Kant’s ethics from being completely antinomian, and explains the func-
tion of moral philosophers, is his epistemic humility. We never know if we
are really listening to our hearts, and in order to avoid self deception we
must continually ask ourselves whether we really are making law or
merely making excuses. Moral rules and principles are tools that we can
use in this moral self examination, Moral Philosophers are not needed to
tell us what to do, but they can help us determine whether we are living up
to our own standards of morality.26
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